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Introduction
We investigate aspects of the institutions and decision making 
processes that affect the coordination of domestic farm policy and 
trade negotiations for agriculture in the United States (US) and the 
European Union (EU). Both entities have domestic agricultural 
policy as expressed in US national farm legislation and the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As the same time, both 
countries have undertaken commitments as signatories to of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). These 
commitments have placed constraints on agricultural policies in 
terms of the nature of policies used and the extent of subsidization. 
Further constraints are being negotiated in the Doha Round under 
the World Trade Organization (WTO.) 
We use the term policy disconnection to describe a lack of 
coherence in between domestic agricultural policy legislation and in 
current and potential agreements on agricultural policy through the 
WTO. 
Relevance
Both US and the EU remain committed to further 
agricultural trade liberalization through the WTO and 
regional trade agreements. As future agreements 
impinge more severely on the ability of the US Congress 
to enact the agricultural policy they prefer, the 
disconnection that we have explored will become more 
pressing. 
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Transaction Cost Politics
Transaction costs are the forces that cause outcomes to diverge 
from optimal outcomes due to time inconsistencies, the nature of 
the principal agent relations and the costs of making, monitoring 
and enforcing agreements.  Dixit notes that transactions costs are 
even more pronounced in politics than in other economic 
relationships (Dixit 1993 p. ). A central theme of transactions costs 
politics (TCP) is to compare how the organization of the institution 
impacts political outcomes and policy decisions, and the evolution 
of the governance structure to minimize overall transactions costs 
(Dixit 1996). Transaction costs economics, and its offshoot TCP 
are not normative, but seek to provide explanatory constructs for 
understanding institutional behavior. 
Ideas from TCP relevant to our questions:
1.TCP shares with theories of rent seeking the hypothesis that 
elected officials will vote according to their interest, defined as 
maximizing their chances of re-election. 
2.Given that legislators are motivated by re-election, they apply a 
cost benefit calculation to whether or not they should make 
particular policy decisions or delegate them to the executive 
branch. This decision is similar to the decision of the firm when it 
evaluates whether or not to buy inputs. If the cost of making policy 
is larger than the benefits, Congress will delegate some amount of 
decision making authority to the executive branch (Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999).
3) The delegation of decision making authority often involves the 
creation of a new agency to perform the delegated task. 
The EU: How Institutional Design Reduces Policy 
Disconnection
The same EU decision-making bodies direct both domestic and trade 
policy for agriculture, and so face fewer problems from transaction 
cost politics than the U.S.  The policy making process for international 
trade negotiations is shown in Figure 1. Initially the European 
Commission proposes a trade negotiating position (Meunier, 34).  
This position is debated to consensus by a special advisory 
committee of senior civil servants called the Committee 133. The 
proposal is transmitted for technical feedback from member states’ 
representatives on the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER). COREPER transmits the negotiating proposal to the 
Council of Ministers; delegates are member states’ agricultural or 
trade ministers. The Council of Ministers agrees on a common 
external bargaining position, based on the Commission’s proposal, for 
international trade negotiations. The mandate outlines the objectives 
for trade negotiations which are conducted by the Commission.  
A similar process is followed for CAP reform, outlined in Article 43(2) 
EEC. The key point is that changes to domestic agricultural policy are 
proposed by the same body, the Commission, which proposed and 
negotiates trade agreements (Swinbank, 47). CAP discussions occur 
between member states’ ministers of agriculture and the appropriate 
commissioner. As the commissioner both proposes domestic 
agricultural reform measures and negotiates international trade 
policies domestic and international policies are more aligned and 
yield fewer transaction costs.
The EU policy making process is characterized specifically by 
increased coordination, more effective delegation, and more credible 
commitments. The founding members delegated authority to the 
supranational level to ensure international trade and agricultural 
agreements were insulated from protectionist and national reelection 
pressures. The pooling of international representations forced the EU 
to accountably entrust various decision making bodies to initiate, 
carry out, and enforce the process steps of policy making and 
international negotiations. 
In our paper, we explore the interaction between the negotiation of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and the CAP reform of 
1992 to illustrate how the EU policy process coordinates the two.
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Policy disconnection is used to describe a lack 
of coherence between domestic agricultural policy 
legislation and in current and potential agreements 
on agricultural policy through the WTO. We argue 
that a greater degree of policy disconnection exists 
in the US than the EU. Transactions costs politics is 
used to explore the decision making processes and 
institutions in both countries and to explain why 
more policy disconnection exists in the United 
States.
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Objectives & Methods
We use transaction costs politics to address these questions:
1.To what extent does the structure of decision making in the 
United States contribute to this disconnection? 
2.How does the structure of decision making differ in the EU, and 
to what extent does that account for different outcomes?
We use theory, historical accounts, and interviews in our analysis 
of the disconnection between domestic agricultural policy 
legislation and negotiations and agreements in the WTO.
The US: Contrasting Delegation Decisions for Trade and Agricultural Policy
Congress has been responsible for domestic farm policy throughout its history. However, the passage of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act was a significant 
policy act and the farm bill has, and continues to have, momentum that has withstood substantial challenges. Congress continues pass farm bills at regular 
intervals. In sharp contrast, Congress has delegated the executive branch increasing authority over trade policy since the 1930s. In 1934 Congress gave the 
power to set tariffs to the Executive Branch. In 1962 Congress created an agency the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) to advise the President 
and to serves the chief representative for trade negotiations. In the 1970s Congress expanded the powers of the STR and in 1979 elevated it to a Cabinet 
position with expanded functions. TCP theorizes that Congress will decide on whether or not to delegate the some decision making to the executive branch 
based on the impact of delegation on the reelection of its members, and also based on the expertise and demands required to pass legislation. Congress 
delegated significant authority for negotiating and implementing trade policy. However, Congress has not delegated power to pass farm legislation and likely will 
not, due to their belief and some evidence that the coalition of interests supporting the farm bill is essential to their reelection. 
Congress has delegated trade authority to the Executive Branch because the cost of negotiating overall trade policy was high. However, Congress delegated 
trade authority before agricultural policy became a part of trade negotiations and Congress has closely guarded its authority over domestic 
agricultural policy. We propose that this mismatch of delegation decisions is a key explanatory variable of the disconnection evident in US domestic 
and trade agricultural policy.
This disconnection is explored in our paper in our case study of the negotiations of the blue box. In both the Uruguay and the Doha rounds of negotiation the 
USTR spent US negotiating capital on creating and revising a blue box for agricultural subsidies accompanied by supply controls, hoping this would ease 
pressure off of restricted red box expenditures. However, in both cases Congress subsequently passed new provisions in the 2002 and 2007 farms bills that 










In the EU, the same actors and processes are used to make domestic 
agricultural policy and trade policy (Figure 1). In the US, Congress 
makes farm policy and delegates substantial authority for trade policy, 
resulting in a disconnection at times between the two (Figure 2).
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